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I. Introduction 
There has been a growing interest in 
the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate, a 
multilateral initiative of six founding 
partner countries in the region – 
Australia, China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea 
and the US – for addressing air pollution, energy 
security and climate protection in a way that 
facilitates development and poverty eradication. 
On 15 October 2007, the Partnership marked a 
new phase of its development at the second 
Ministerial meeting in New Delhi, welcoming 
the entry of Canada as the seventh partner. 
Moreover the Ministers announced a portfolio of 
18 flagship projects and activities and endorsed 
the Asia-Pacific Energy Technology Cooperation 
Centre (Asia Pacific Partnership, 2007b).  
The Partnership is expected to provide a 
promising option to three main challenges: the 
unprecedented rate of economic growth and the 
corresponding level of energy demand and GHG 
emissions in emerging economies; increasing 
concerns with the level-playing field in markets 
of major commodities such as steel, aluminium, 
cement; and the need of cleaner technologies as a 
tool to move towards a low-carbon economy. It 
engages emerging economies in the region, 
China, India, and the Republic of Korea, on 
practical action for clean development and 
climate. It also encourages cooperation on 
estimating full potential to improve energy 
efficiency and reduce GHG emissions and 
identifying barriers to achieving the potential. 
Lastly, it intends to accelerate the development 
and deployment of cleaner technologies through 
specific projects ranging from R&D to 
information exchange and capacity- building.  
This paper presents an overview of the Asia Pacific 
Partnership, beginning with a literature review. This 
is followed by a comparison of the initiative with the 
EU energy and climate change package and an 
examination of the role that the Partnership can play 
in the emerging landscape of reorganising climate 
cooperation in both its formal and informal aspects: 
bilateral and multilateral technology partnerships 
which are compatible with the UNFCCC objective; 
and development of tools for measuring progress 
such as benchmarking, performance indicators and 
energy efficiency or environment indices. Through 
coordination with actions in each aspect in other 
parts of the world or those on a global scale, the 
Partnership could have wider implications beyond its 
partner countries. 
2. Literature review 
The majority of the literature on the Partnership 
was published at the time of announcement of its 
formation in 2005 or in the early stage in 2006, 
when information about its activities was largely 
limited. Nevertheless, it would be fair to suggest 
that the Partnership was initially received with 
cautious welcome at best or even scepticism among 
proponents of the Kyoto Protocol in the EU and 
even in the US (see Jeffords, 2006; Lieberman, 
2006; Doniger, 2006). 
There were, broadly speaking, two contrasting 
views, sharing suspicion about the Partnership on a 
conflicting assumption. A predominant assumption 
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was that the Partnership will be less competent 
than the Kyoto Protocol. There will be lack of 
environmental effectiveness (lack of 
mandatory cap on absolute GHG emissions), 
lack of efficiency (lack of market mechanism, 
lack of close coordination among countries), 
and lack of resources, all of which was 
considered to reflect lack of commitments 
(Sherrard et al. 2006; Anderson 2006). Thus 
Partnership can be seen as a distraction or 
diversion from the Kyoto Protocol. 
Another assumption was that the Partnership 
was strong enough to compete with and 
substitute for the Protocol and its successor. 
The Partnership encompasses countries which 
decided not to ratify the treaty (US, Australia) 
and non-Annex I countries (China, India and 
Republic of Korea). This leads to suspicion 
that the Partnership could become an 
alternative or substitute (McGee & Taplin, 
2006; Bossley, 2005; for critique, see Kanie, 
2007).  
Foreseeing such suspicion partner countries 
explicitly stated that the Partnership will be 
‘consistent with and contribute to our efforts 
under’ the UNFCCC and ‘will complement, 
but not replace’ the Kyoto Protocol. Among 
others Japan commits itself to both the 
Partnership and the treaty. Some also believe 
that the Partnership could complement or 
supplement the Protocol (Andresen, 2006; 
Skodvin & Andresen, 2007). 
To set the scene, this paper stands on the 
understanding that the Partnership is not 
primarily or exclusively meant as a means to 
reduce GHG emissions but aims at GHG 
intensity improvement as one of the goals it set 
out.   
3. What is the Asia-Pacific Partnership?
1  
The formation of the Asia-Pacific Partnership 
was announced in July 2005, followed by its 
official launch in Sydney in January 2006. The 
Partnership has two faces: a multilateral 
                                                 
1 I am most grateful to a number of Partnership 
participants for contributing to background research, 
especially through interviews. I also benefited from 
discussions at the first meeting of the CEPS Task Force 
on sectoral industry approaches, Brussels, 18 September 
2007. For more information on the APP and its activities 
see  http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/default.htm 
and Australia (2007). 
partnership involving seven countries in the Asia-
Pacific region; and a public-private partnership on a 
regional scale. From the beginning it was neither 
supposed to be a rigid framework for negotiations 
in general or target-setting in particular nor a base 
for a regional market trading GHG emissions. It 
was meant to be an initiative for coordinating 
implementation of policies and projects. In essence 
it can be characterised as a sectoral approach 
combining cooperation on the development and 
deployment of technologies with reforms for 
removing barriers to mitigation potential.
2 Another 
important aspect which has been rather neglected is 
its decentralised structure accommodating space for 
divergence in national and sectoral circumstances. 
For example, China viewed its participation in the 
Partnership as the example of its active promotion 
of ‘more international cooperation mechanisms that 
fit each country’s specific situation and promote 
active involvement’ (Zhang HB 2006). Given 
different national circumstances, the US stresses 
the context of nationally defined outcomes within 
which the Partnership works to identify needed 
methods, technologies and financial arrangements 
(Connaughton, 2006). 
3.1 Aims & objectives       
In the Asia Pacific Partnership partners have come 
together voluntarily to advance clean development 
and climate objectives, recognising the urgent need 
of development and poverty eradication. They 
envisage enhanced cooperation to meet both their 
increased energy needs and associated challenges, 
including those related to air pollution, energy 
security and GHG intensities. The Partnership 
focuses on the development and deployment of 
cleaner, more efficient technologies. For this 
purpose it enables business, government and 
researchers to work together and participate in task 
forces as equal partners. 
The Partnership is an initiative combining sectoral 
cooperation across countries on the development 
and deployment of technologies with sectoral 
reforms in selected countries for removing barriers 
to achieving full potential to reduce GHG 
emissions and energy efficiency improvements. 
The former will benefit from the involvement of 
business whereas the latter will suit government-to-
government actions (Connaughton, 2006).  
                                                 
2 Montgomery & Tuladhar (2006) discuss how the Partnership 
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3.2 Partner countries  
The Asia-Pacific Partnership consists of seven 
partner countries—Australia, Canada, China, 
India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the 
United States. The initial six partner countries, 
other than Canada, account for 45% of global 
GDP, 50% of GHG emissions and 48% of 
global energy use (Government of Australia, 
2007), and they produce about 65% of the 
world’s coal, 48% of the world’s steel, 37% of 
the world’s aluminium, and 61% of the world’s 
cement.
3 New Zealand has been also exploring 
possibilities for participation in the 
Partnership.
4 
Other than their geographic location there is 
not much common feature among these 
countries. In fact they are characterised by high 
heterogeneity in national circumstances such as 
the stage of development, dependence on trade 
or foreign direct investment, resource 
endowments  ― above all energy mix ― , 
GHG intensity and its emission trajectories, 
financial and administrative capacity, and the 
role of regulation or market in achieving policy 
objectives.  
High heterogeneity in national circumstances 
at least partly explains the absence in the 
Partnership agenda of institutional issues. 
There are no common legally-binding rules or 
targets, not any institutions of its own but 
coordination with existing international 
institutions, not any resources ― neither 
budget nor permanent secretariat ― of its own 
but contributions from partners to individual 
projects, or not a common format of Task 
Force Action Plans but guidance. The 
Partnership is based on a highly decentralised 
structure largely relying on coordination of 
policies and projects along the line of the 
UNFCCC.  
3.3 Task Forces, action plans & projects   
Decentralisation is further strengthened by the 
structure of the Asia-Pacific Partnership. It is a 
public-private partnership on a regional scale, 
                                                 
3 http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/default.htm 
4 Cabinet paper, “Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate” 
(http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/climate/resources/cabine
t-papers/mfat-cab-paper.html); CBC Min 06 17/19 
(http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/climate/resources/cabine
t-papers/cbc-min-06-17-19.html).  
encouraging interaction of business, government 
and researchers from partner countries. In theory it 
sets up a dual structure of developing both policies 
and projects, respectively through the Policy 
Implementation Committee (PIC) (section 3.4) and 
sector-based Task Forces. In practice the former 
relies on the latter as the base for its strategic 
planning (Connaughton, 2006). For example, 
Renewable Energy and Distributed Generation 
Task Force analyses current policy or discuss 
effectiveness of exiting policy frameworks, and 
have peer review in each country in a frank and 
open way. 
There are eight Task Forces focusing on specific 
key sectors to address clean development issues: 
three energy supply sectors (cleaner fossil energy, 
renewable energy and distributed generation, power 
generation and transmission); and five energy-
intensive sectors (steel, aluminium, cement, coal 
mining, buildings and appliances) (see Appendix 
1). There is divergence in organisation of market 
across sectors and across countries within the same 
sector. These Task Forces are designed to facilitate 
the development, diffusion, deployment, and 
transfer of cost-effective, cleaner, more efficient 
technologies and practices among the partners 
through concrete and substantial cooperation so as 
to achieve practical results. Each task force is led 
by Chair and Vice-chair from partner countries and 
represented by two government officials and two 
representatives of the private sector from each 
country.  
These Task Forces respectively formulated Action 
Plans (Asia Pacific Partnership, 2006a) together 
with a portfolio of 110 projects ranging from 
technology development and deployment to 
information exchange and technical cooperation. 
While each Task Force considers any project 
involving at least two partners for inclusion in 
Action Plans, most Task Forces have developed 
projects involving all the initial six partner 
countries (see Appendix 1) despite considerable 
divergence in their national circumstances.  
Most Task Forces put effort on exchange of 
information especially about best practice. Another 
important exercise is assessment of technology 
options and estimation of their potential to reduce 
GHG emissions. Steel Task Force identified the 
energy conservation technologies and estimated 
their potential ― as a total of potential in the initial 
six partner countries ― to reduce CO2 emissions in 
light of progress in technology transfer 4 | Noriko Fujiwara 
(Government of Japan, 2007). Similarly both 
Aluminium and Power Generation and 
Transmission Task Forces assess different 
technology options to reduce emissions. 
Cement Task Force pursues in parallel 
technology transfer and estimation of total 
technological potential in the initial six partner 
countries. The latter then leads to the 
identification of barriers to achieving full 
potential, for which benchmarking can be used 
as one of the tools. A national benchmark does 
not necessarily mean best practice. For the 
benchmark falls as technology transfer makes 
progress. A work group in the Task Force 
reached a conclusion to use as agreed 
performance indicators a combination of the 
mandatory index of cement-based CO2 
emission intensity (net) using the CSI CO2 
protocol as a national benchmark, and a 
voluntary index of either the total energy 
intensity for clinker (net) or one that is 
originally expressed separately in the net 
thermal energy and electrical power intensity 
for clinker.
5 Such an exercise will continue 
together with an estimation of potential as well 
as identification of opportunities and barriers. 
3.4 Policy Implementation Committee 
The Policy Implementation Committee (PIC) 
sets the overall policy direction and outreach 
strategy for the Partnership while serving as 
the mechanism for introduction of new projects 
and participants in Partnership (Connaughton, 
2006). The PIC is chaired by the US and 
represented by three senior government 
officials from each country. It coordinates 
work of Task Forces, and provides them with 
guidance while allowing them flexibility to 
develop projects and activities. It encourages 
them to take actions to manage implementation 
of Action Plans; to promote the Partnership 
and Action Plans to potential partners in 
projects and activities; to coordinate review 
and reporting of projects and activities in their 
Action Plans; to conduct strategic planning on 
future Partnership cooperation within the Task 
Force theme or sector; and to review new 
project proposals by partner countries (Asia 
Pacific Partnership, 2007a).  
                                                 
5 I am grateful to Dr.Y. Izumi from Taiheiyo Cement for 
an update of the Cement Task Force. Net means 
excluding alternative and biomass fuels. 
3.5 Finance 
Australia has committed AUD 100 million 
(approximately US$75 million) funding over five 
years to support the Partnership activities. The 
funding has been allocated to eligible projects 
operating under Task Forces. Funding of a further 
AUD 50 million has been announced in September 
2007 (Australia, 2007). According to the White 
House, the US has been able in the past fiscal year 
to contribute US$45 million in funds that support 
the projects and activities of the Partnership 
(Connaughton, 2007).
6 The modest level of initial 
funding is meant to be some kind of seed money 
that can mobilise investment from the private 
sector. 
3.6 Prospects for wider membership 
Given the initial reaction as described above, some 
participants have a positive view about the growing 
interest, from a technological perspective, on the 
part of non-partner countries in the Asia Pacific 
Partnership. On the other hand, however, there will 
be a number of challenges to wider membership. 
First, the advantage of limiting the number of 
members, which Kellow (2006) calls mini-
lateralism,  would be lost. A group of six has 
already turned out to be difficult enough to agree 
on issues such as data collection. Second, the 
Partnership has no built-in financial mechanism to 
reward a new member. Limited resources are 
allocated to specific projects as seed money. It is up 
to the business or government to capitalise the 
initial funding. Third and most importantly, it was 
not until 2006 that all the Task Forces managed to 
launch projects, which are still in progress and 
remain to deliver tangible benefits.  
4 .  C o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  t h e  E U  E n e r g y  a n d  
Climate Change Package 
If the Asia-Pacific Partnership is an initiative for 
coordinating implementation of policies and 
projects, it can be compared with the EU Energy 
and Climate Change Package (EC, 2007a; see 
Appendix 2) rather than the Kyoto Protocol. 
Between the Partnership and the EU Package there 
is a common coverage of actions in the energy 
sector (e.g. cleaner fossil energy, renewable energy, 
power generation and transmission), and cross-
cutting issues (e.g. R&D and energy efficiency). 
                                                 
6 The White House proposed to contribute US$52 million for 
the next fiscal year (US 2007). I thank Prof. T. Brewer for his 
expertise in the US budgetary process. The Asia-Pacific Partnership| 5 
The Partnership leaves cross-cutting issues to 
each Task Force (Connaughton, 2006). The EU 
Energy Package does not take a sectoral 
approach but addresses opportunities in 
specific sectors under prioritised themes. For 
example, EU actions for energy efficiency 
improvements cover appliances and buildings 
as well as heat and electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution. One important 
omission from the Asia-Pacific Partnership is 
transport.  
5. Coordination with regional or global 
actions 
Possibilities for coordinating the Asia Pacific 
Partnership with regional or global actions can 
be explored in both formal and informal 
aspects. In a formal aspect, having ratified the 
UNFCCC, all the partner countries of the 
Partnership participate in bilateral and 
multilateral technology partnerships (see 
Appendix 3; de Coninck et al., 2007). The 
Charter indeed states in the ‘shared vision’ that 
the Asia Pacific Partnership is built up on the 
foundation of existing bilateral and multilateral 
initiatives. Some of these initiatives not only 
involve emerging economies such as China 
and Republic of Korea but also the EU and its 
member states. This implies that actions in the 
Asia-Pacific region and the EU have been 
loosely coordinated through their membership 
in a web of bilateral and multilateral 
partnerships which are compatible with the 
UNFCCC objective. Indeed, it is stressed from 
a Chinese perspective that the Partnership can 
be only part of the technological solution and it 
alone cannot ensure the deployment of best 
available technologies in the marketplace or 
rolling-out of new technologies at the pace and 
on the scale needed (Zhang, 2006). 
To overcome the limits as such, international 
financial institutions could play a role in 
supporting the Partnership. The IPC recently 
invited international financial institutions such 
as the World Bank, the International Finance 
Corporation, the Asia Development Bank, the 
Global Environment Facility and Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation to discuss how to boost 
investment in cleaner technology (Japan, 2007).  
In an informal aspect, the Partnership could provide 
business and governments with opportunities to 
encourage sharing of data and knowledge, facilitate 
comparability of actions, and improve 
transparency. The Partnership has committed to 
development of tools for measuring progress such 
as benchmarking (e.g. Aluminium, Cement, Steel 
Task Forces), performance metrics or indicators 
(e.g. Power Generation and Transmission, Steel 
Task Forces) and economic, energy efficiency or 
environment indices (e.g. Renewable Energy and 
Distributed Generation, Steel Task Forces). Given 
its expertise in sectoral best practices, 
benchmarking and an energy efficiency indicator, 
the International Energy Agency is a natural 
mediator and has been recently invited to the IPC 
meeting for further cooperation especially with the 
Cement and Steel Task Forces (Japan, 2007).  
Similarly the knowledge base for best practices 
(e.g. Power Generation and Transmission, 
Renewable Energy and Distributed Generation, 
Aluminium, Cement, Steel, Buildings and 
Appliances Task Forces) (Hendricks, 2007; FEPCO 
2007) can be expanded or shared with an equivalent 
database developing elsewhere.  
Lastly exchange of information about sectoral 
reforms for removing barriers to mitigation 
potential (e.g. Renewable Energy and Distributed 
Generation, Cement and Steel Task Forces) (Clean 
Technology AustralAsia, 2007; Thompson & 
Neuhoff, 2007) could be relevant to the UNFCCC 
Dialogue on Long-term Cooperative Action and the 
World Bank.  
In summary the likely scenario would be, if 
successful, steady development of the Partnership, 
enhanced by coordination with other regional and 
global actions and by closer cooperation with 
international institutions and fora.   6 | Noriko Fujiwara 
References 
Anderson, J.W. (2006), The Asia-Pacific Initiative: Better than Kyoto?, A weathervine commentary,  1 
February. 
Andresen, S. (2006), “The Asia-Pacific Partnership: Political window dressing or alternative to Kyoto 
Protocol?”, Cicerone, 1-2006. 
Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (2007a), “Further guidance to the Task Forces”, 4 
April. 
Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (2007b), Communiqué, Second Ministerial 
Meeting, New Delhi, 15 October. 
Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (2006a), Executive Summary of Task Force 
Action Plans, 31 October. 
Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (2006b), Aluminium Task Force Action Plan. 
Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (2006c), Cement Task Force Action Plan. 
Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (2006d), Power Generation and Transmission 
Task Force Action Plan. 
Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (2006e), Renewable Energy and Distributed 
Generation Task Force Action Plan. 
Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (2006f), Steel Task Force Action Plan. 
Cleantechnology AustralAsia (2007), “Pursuing clean energy business in India”, background paper prepared for 
the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, June. 
Connaughton, J.L. (2006), Testimony of James L. Connaughton, Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality, 
Executive Office of the President, before the United States Senate, Committee on Environment and 
Public Works, 20 September. 
Connaughton, J. (2007), New Delhi Ministerial U.S. Country Statement, Second Ministerial Meeting, New 
Delhi, 15 October. 
De Coninck. H.C. et al. (2007), “International technology-oriented agreements to address climate change”, 
ECN-E—07-002, ECN and Resources for the Future, January. 
Doniger, D.D. (2006), Testimony of David D. Doniger, Policy Director, Climate Center, Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Hearing on the Asia Pacific Partnership, Committee on Environment and Public 
Works, United States Senate, 20 September. 
European Commission (2007a), An energy policy for Europe, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Council and the European Parliament, COM(2007)1 final, 10 January. 
European Commission (2007b), Towards a European Strategic Energy Technology Plan, Communication from 
the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2006)847 final, 10 January. 
Federation of Electric Power Companies, Report of the Asia-Pacific Partnership “Peer Review Activity” in 
Japan co-hosted by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan and the Federation of 
Electric Power Companies, 16-19 April’. http://www.fepc.or.jp/english/env/app/ 
Government of Australia (2007), “Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate: Partnership for 
action”, second edition.  
Government of Japan, 2007, ‘The 4
th Policy Implementation Committee, Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate’ (in Japanese), 20 July. 
Hendricks, J. (2007), “The Asia-Pacific Partnership: an innovative effort to accelerate the development and 
deployment of clean energy technologies”, Electric Perspectives, January/February. 
Jeffords, J. (2006), Statement of Senator Jim Jeffords, I-Vt. Environment and Public Works Committee, 
Hearing on Asia Pacific Partnership, 20 September.  The Asia-Pacific Partnership| 7 
Kanie, N. (2007), “Towards distributive climate change governance: A way forward beyond 2012”, paper 
submitted to 2007 Amsterdam Conference on Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, 
24-26 May. 
Kellow, A. (2006), Transcript of Proceedings, 31 March 2006, pp.49-53, Parliament of Australia, Joint 
Standing Committee on Treaties, Treaty Scrutiny: A ten year review, report tabled on 9 October.  
Lieberman, J.I. (2006), Statement of Joseph I. Lieberman, Hearing on examining approaches embodied in the 
Asia Pacific Partnership, 20 September. 
McGee, J. and R. Taplin(2006), “The Asia-Pacific partnership on clean development and climate: A 
complement or competitor to the Kyoto Protocol?”, Global Change, Peace and Security, Vol. 18, No. 
3, 173-192. 
Montgomery, W.D. and S.D. Tuladhar (2006), “The Asia Pacific Partnership: Its role in promoting a positive 
climate for investment, economic growth and greenhouse gas reductions”, 28 June. 
Sherrard, J. et al. (2006), “First progress report on the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and 
Climate”, April. 
Skodvin, T. and S. Andresen (2007), “The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate: 
Supplement or Alternative to the Kyoto Protocol?”, paper presented at the 48
th Annual Convention of 
the International Studies Association, Chicago, 28 February-3 March. 
Thompson, G.M. and J.O. Neuhoff (2007), “Joining forces – Asia-Pacific partnership offers new opportunities 
for distributed generation”, Cogeneration and On-Site Power Production, May. 
US Executive Office of the President (2007), Federal climate change expenditures report to Congress, May. 
Zhang, Haibin (2006), “China’s position in international climate change negotiations: Continuities and 
changes”, Journal of International Peace, Vol. 3, No. 2, The Seoul Peace Prize Cultural Foundation, 
December. 
Zhang, Z.X. (2006), “China, the United States and technology cooperation on climate control”, SSRN, August 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=953292). 8 | Noriko Fujiwara 
Appendix 1 
Task Forces of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development & Climate
7 
Cleaner Fossil Energy Task Force 
The Task Force identified a range of key advanced coal and gas technologies that can significantly 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, air-borne pollutants and other environmental impacts. Such 
technologies include Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) producing hydrogen from coal, 
Ultra-Supercritical Coal, and use of carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage. The Task Force is 
working to share best practices, eliminate market barriers to the deployment of these technologies, and 
increase the utilization and efficiency of cleaner fossil energy. Australia currently serves the Chair. 
The Co-Chair is China. 
Renewable Energy and Distributed Generation Task Force 
The Task Force is working to promote not only renewable energy technologies such as hydro, solar, 
geothermal and wind, but also distributed generation. To promote these objectives the Task Force will 
strive to identify barriers to technology transfer and financing associated with deployment of 
renewable and distributed generation technologies focusing on cost-competitive technologies with 
both on- and off-grid applications. Republic of Korea currently serves the Chair. The Co-Chair is 
Australia (Asia Pacific Partnership 2006e; Thompson and Neuhoff 2007). 
Power Generation and Transmission Task Force 
The Task Force is working to bring efficiency gains to all partners through their activities. It proposed 
activities organized along Best Practices for Power Generation, Best Practices for Transmission and 
Distribution, Best Practices for Demand Side Management, and Information Sharing. United States of 
America currently serves the Chair. The Co-Chair is China (Asia Pacific Partnership 2006d). 
Aluminium Task Force 
Partners will promote best practice performance, increase technical support, and identify impediments 
to deployment of best available and affordable technology. The partner countries’ aluminium 
associations agreed to a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in May 2006 including a commitment 
to enhance the GHG performance of aluminium production processes and to enhance existing 
cooperative arrangements across the sector. Australia currently serves the Chair. The Co-Chair is 
United States of America (Asia Pacific Partnership 2006b). 
Buildings and Appliances Task Force 
By addressing power demand in appliances, office and consumer electronics, and lighting as well as 
building design and operations, the Task Force strives to significantly improve energy efficiency 
especially in the residential and commercial sectors. This will lead to economic benefits and defer 
investment in energy supply. Republic of Korea currently serves the Chair. Co-Chair is United States 
of America. 
Cement Task Force 
The Task Force is working to achieve its long-term goals to reduce CO2 emissions, conserve energy 
through sharing information on clean energy technologies, and cooperating further to diffuse such 
technologies. Japan currently serves the Chair (Asia Pacific Partnership 2006c). 
Coal Mining Task Force 
The Task Force is working to improve coal mining and beneficiation efficiency, reduce coal’s 
environmental impacts, and improve coal mining’s safety record. This includes promoting best 
available technologies and practices in coal preparation, coal mine methane capture and improved 
mine health and safety. United States of America currently serves the Chair. The Co-Chair is India. 
                                                 
7 For overview of task force activities see Asia Pacific Partnership (2006a). The Asia-Pacific Partnership| 9 
Steel Task Force 
The Task Force is working to identify technologies to reduce the emissions and energy consumption 
of the global steel sector. Japan currently serves the Chair. The Co-Chair is India (Asia Pacific 
Partnership 2006f). 
Projects 
Projects involving all the initial six partners include:  
•  Cleaner Fossil Energy TF: assessing post-combustion capture for coal-fired power stations in 
partner countries; CO2 carbon capture and storage programme; Asia-Pacific gas market growth 
•  Renewable Energy and Distributed Generation TF: high efficiency solar power stations for 
affordable energy; identifying optimal legal frameworks for renewable energy in China and 
India 
•  Power Generation and Transmission TF: best practice in power generation; energy regulatory 
and market development forum 
•  Buildings and Appliances TF: harmonisation of appliance testing procedures; high 
performance buildings and developments; enhancement of building energy codes; energy 
efficiency; utility regulation and incentives; alignment of national standby power approaches  
•  Cement TF: Status report and benchmarking; cement centre of excellence 
•  Coal Mining TF: leading practice sustainable development programme for the mining 
industry; coal mine safety strategy 
•  Steel TF: annual steel experts workshop  10 | Noriko Fujiwara 
Appendix 2 
EU Energy & Climate Change Package 
8
 
The European Commission has proposed a comprehensive package of measures to combat climate change and 
boost the EU’s energy security and competitiveness. The package sets a series of ambitious targets on 
greenhouse gas emissions and renewable energy and aim to create a true internal market for energy and 
strengthen effective regulation. The key elements of the package include: 
Strategic objectives 
•  An EU objective in international negotiations of 30% reduction in GHG emissions by developed 
countries by 2020 compared to 1990. In addition 2050 global GHG emissions must be reduced by up to 
50% compared to 1990, implying reductions in industrialised countries of 60-80% by 2050. 
•  An EU commitment to achieve at least a 20% reduction in GHG emissions by 2020 compared to 1990. 
A European Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan) 
The SET-Plan (2007b) will present a long-term vision of how the energy technology landscape could evolve: 
•  By 2020 technologies will have to make the 20% renewable target a reality by permitting a sharp 
increase in the share of lower cost renewables; 
•  By 2030 electricity and heat will increasingly need to be produced from low carbon sources and 
extensive near-zero emission fossil fuel power plants with CO2 capture and storage. Transport will 
need to increasingly adapt to using second generation biofuels and hydrogen fuel cells. 
•  For 2050 and beyond, the switch to low carbon in the European energy system should be completed 
with an overall European energy mix that could include large shares for renewables, sustainable coal 
and gas, sustainable hydrogen, and, for those member states that want, Generation IV fission power 
and fusion energy. 
The Commission will propose a first SET-Plan by the end of 2007 for endorsement by the 2008 Spring 
European Council. 
Sectoral objectives 
•  More energy efficient buildings, appliances, equipment, industrial processes and transport systems; 
•  Developing biofuels, in particular second generation biofuels, to become fully competitive alternatives 
to hydrocarbons; 
•  Getting large scale offshore wind competitive within the short term and paving the way towards a 
competitive European offshore supergrid; 
•  Getting photovoltaic electricity competitive to harness solar energy; 
•  Using full cell and hydrogen technologies to exploit their benefits in decentralised generation and 
transport; 
•  Sustainable coal and gas technologies, particularly carbon capture and storage; 
•  Leading in fourth generation fission nuclear reactors and future fusion technology to boost the 
competitiveness, safety and security of nuclear electricity, as well as reduce the level of waste.   
Sectoral targets 
•  A target of 10% minimum interconnection levels 
•  A binding target of 20% of its overall energy mix will be sourced from renewable energy by 2020 
•  A minimum target for biofuels of 10% 
•  An increase in its annual spending on energy research for the next seven years by at least 50% 
•  Saving 20% of total primary energy consumption by 2020 
•  Construction of 12 large-scale demonstration plants in Europe by 2015 
                                                 
8 Press release, European Commission, ‘Commission proposes an integrated energy and climate change package to cut 
emissions for the 21
st Century’, 10 January 2007; European Commission (2007a). The Asia-Pacific Partnership| 11 
Appendix 3 
Major global partnerships on energy and climate change
 
Table 1: Major multilateral global partnerships on energy and climate change  
 
Partnerships Description 
Global Gas 
Flaring Reduction 
(GGFR), (2002-) 
The GGFR is the World Bank-led initiative launched at the 2002 World Summit 
on Sustainable Development (WSSD). It is a public-private partnership that 
facilitates and supports national efforts to use currently flared gas by promoting 
effective regulatory frameworks and tackling the constraints on gas utilization. 
Poverty reduction is also an integral part of the programme.  
Partnership for 
Clean Fuels and 
Vehicles 
(PCFV)(2002-) 
The PCFV was also launched at the 2002 WSSD as a public-private partnership. It 
will help reduce vehicular air pollution in developing countries through the 
promotion of clean fuels and vehicles, and will focus initially on the elimination 
of lead in gasoline and the phase down of sulphur in diesel and gasoline fuels 
concurrent with the adoption of cleaner vehicle technologies. 
The Johannesburg 
Renewable 
Energy Coalition 
(JREC) (2002-) 
The JREC was launched following the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 
agreed at the 2002 WSSD. Ministers and senior officials identified a large range of 
policy objectives that can be addressed through increased renewable energy 
policies and measures including objectives related to environment, energy, and 
development. 
Carbon 
Sequestration 
Leadership Forum 
(CSLF), (2003-) 
The CSLF focuses on development of improved cost-effective technologies for 
the separation and capture of CO2 for its transport and long-term safe storage. Its 
purpose is to make these technologies broadly available internationally and to 
identify and address wider issues relating to carbon capture and storage. 
International 
Partnership 
for the Hydrogen 
Economy (IPHE), 
(2003-) 
The IPHE aims to accelerate the transition to a hydrogen economy. It serves as a 
mechanism to organize and improvement effective, efficient and focused 
international research, development, demonstration and commercial utilization 
activities related to hydrogen and fuel cell technologies.  
Methane to 
Markets 
Partnership, 
(2004-) 
The Partnership is an initiative that advances cost-effective, near-term methane 
recovery and use as a clean energy source. Its goal is to reduce global methane 
emissions in order to enhance economic growth, strengthen energy security, 
improve air quality, improve industrial safety, and reduce GHG emissions. 
FutureGen,  
(2005-) 
FutureGen is a public-private partnership to build a first-of-its-kind coal-fuelled, 
near-zero emissions power plant.  
Renewable 
Energy and 
Energy Efficiency 
Partnership 
(REEEP)(2004-) 
The REEEP was conceived at the 2002 WSSD and established in 2004. It is a 
public-private partnership that structures policy and regulatory initiatives for 
clean energy and facilitates financing for energy projects. Its aim is to accelerate 
the integration of renewables into the energy mix and to advocate energy 
efficiency as a path to improved energy security and reduced carbon emissions, 
ensuring socio-economic benefits. 
Generation-IV 
International 
Forum (GIF) 
Countries work together to lay the groundwork for the 4th generation nuclear 
reactor, Generation IV. 
Global Nuclear 
Energy 
Partnership 
(GNEP) 
GNEP was first announced in 2006. GNEP seeks to develop worldwide consensus 
on enabling expanded use of clean, safe and affordable nuclear energy to meet 
growing electricity demand. It proposes a nuclear fuel cycle that enhances energy 
security.  
Sources: http://www.cslforum.org/; http://www.methanetomarkets.org/; http://www.iphe.net/; http://www.worldbank.org/; 
http://www.futuregenalliance.org/about.stm; http://www.reeep.org/; http://www.unep.org/pcfv/; 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/jrec/index_en.htm; http ://gif.inel.gov/; http ://www.gnep.gov/ 12 | Noriko Fujiwara 
Table 2. Major bilateral global partnerships on energy and climate change 
 
Partnership Description 
US Fossil Energy 
Bilateral 
Agreements 
The formats and goals are set bilaterally. 
US ENERGY 
STAR agreements 
There are international agreements to promote certain ENERGY STAR qualified 
products. They aim to unify voluntary energy-efficiency labelling programmes in 
major global markets and make it easier for partners to participate by providing a 
single set of energy-efficiency qualifications. 
International 
Nuclear Energy 
Research Initiative  
(I-NERI) 
The I-NERI is a US programme designed to foster collaborative research and 
development with international partners in advanced nuclear energy systems. It has 
implemented bilateral collaborative agreements. 
EU bilateral 
cooperation 
initiatives  
The formats and goals are set bilaterally. 
Sources: http://www.fossil.energy.gov/international/International_Partners/International_Partners.html 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=partners.intl_implementation; http://www.energetics.com/ineri_client/index.aspx; 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/international/index_en.htm 
 
Table 3: Multilateral global partnerships and their main participants 
 
  APP APP APP APP APP APP APP EU  EU  EU  EU   
  Au Ca Ch In  Ja Ko US Fr Ge It UK  EU 
GGFR   ○       ○  ○    ○  ○ 
PCFV  ●  ●  ●    ●       
J R E C           ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
CSLF  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
IPHE  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ● 
MMP  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●  
REEEP  ○  ○    ●  ●  ○  ●  ○  ○  ○  ○ 
GIF  ●    ●  ●  ●  ●    ●  
GNEP  ●  ●  ●  ●  ●    ◘  
Legend: ○: member and donor; ●: member; ◘: observer 
Note: EU is a donor to GGFR, and led the launch of JREC. European Commission is a member of CSLF, IPHE, and 
REEEP. EURATOM is a member of GIF.  
 
Table 4: Bilateral global partnerships and their main participants 
 
 Au  Ca  Ch  In  Ja  Ko  US  Fr  Ge  It  UK  EU 
Fossil Fuel  ●  ●  ●
9  ●
10     ○    ●  ●  
ENERGY 
STAR 
●  ●    ●  ○      ● 
I-NERI   ●    ●  ●  ○  ●      
Cooperation       ●
11  ●
12     ●      ○ 
Legend: ○: host country; ●: its partners.  
 
                                                 
9 A bilateral Fossil Energy Protocol has been extended to 2010. There is a public-private partnership, US-China Oil and 
Gas Industry Forum.  
10 A US-India Energy Dialogue was launched in May 2005. 
11 EU-China Partnership on Climate Change was agreed in September 2005.  
12 EU-India Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change was agreed in September 2005. 